We develop semiparametric tests for conditional independence in time series models of causal effects. Our approach is motivated by empirical studies of monetary policy effects and is semiparametric in the sense that we model the process determining the distribution of treatment-the policy propensity score-but leave the model for outcomes unspecified. A conceptual innovation is that we adapt the cross-sectional potential outcomes framework to a time series setting. We also develop root-T consistent distribution-free inference methods for full conditional independence testing, appropriate for dependent data and allowing for first-step estimation of the (multinomial) propensity score.
I. Introduction
T HE causal connection between monetary policy and real economic variables is one of the most important and widely studied questions in macroeconomics. Most of the evidence on this question comes from regression-based statistical tests. That is, researchers regress an outcome variable such as industrial production on measures of monetary policy, while controlling for lagged outcomes and contemporaneous and lagged covariates, with the statistical significance of policy variables providing the test results of interest. Two of the most influential empirical studies in this spirit are by Sims (1972 Sims ( , 1980 , who discusses conceptual as well as empirical problems in the money-income nexus.
The foundation of regression-based causality tests is a simple conditional independence assumption. The core null hypothesis is that conditional on lagged outcomes and an appropriate set of control variables, the absence of a causal relationship should be manifest in a statistically insignificant connection between policy surprises and contemporaneous and future outcomes. In the language of cross-sectional program evaluation, policy variables are assumed to be as good as randomly assigned after appropriate regression conditioning, so that conditional effects have a causal interpretation. This is obviously a strong assumption, yet it seems a natural place to begin empirical work, at least in the absence of a randomized trial or compelling exclusion restrictions. The conditional independence assumption is equivalent to postulating independent structural innovations in a structural vector autoregression (SVAR), a tool that has taken center stage in the analysis of monetary policy effects. Recent contributions to this literature include Bernanke and Blinder (1992) , Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1996, 1999) , Gordon and Leeper (1994) , Sims and Zha (2006) , and Strongin (1995) .
While providing a flexible tool for the analysis of causal relationships, an important drawback of regression-based conditional independence tests, including those based on SVARs, is the need for an array of auxiliary assumptions that are hard to assess and interpret, especially in a time series context. Specifically, regression tests rely on a model of the process determining GDP growth or other macroeconomic outcomes. Much of the recent literature in monetary macroeconomics has focused on dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models for this purpose. Sims and Zha (2006) noted that SVARs can be understood as first-order approximations to a potentially nonlinear DSGE model. Moreover, the SVAR framework for hypothesis testing implicitly requires specification of both a null and an alternative model.
The principal contribution of this paper is to develop an approach to time series causality testing that shifts the focus away from a model of the process determining outcomes toward a model of the process determining policy decisions. In particular, we develop causality tests that rely on a model for the conditional probability of a policy shift, which we call the policy propensity score, leaving the model for outcomes unspecified. In the language of the SVAR literature, our approach reduces the modeling burden to the specification, identification, and estimation of the structural policy innovation, while leaving the rest of the system unspecified. This limited focus should increase robustness. For example, we do not need to specify functional form or lag length in 726 THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS a model for GDP growth. Rather, we need to be concerned solely with the time horizon and variables relevant for Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) decision making, issues about which there is some institutional knowledge. Moreover, the multinomial nature of policy variables such as the one we study provides a natural guide as to the choice of functional form for the policy model.
A second contribution of our paper is the outline of a potential-outcomes framework for causal research using time series data. In particular, we show that a generalized Sims-type definition of dynamic causality provides a coherent conceptual basis for time series causal inference analogous to the selection-on-observables assumption widely used in cross-section econometrics. The analogy between a time series causal inquiry and a cross-sectional selectionon-observables framework is even stronger when the policy variable can be coded as a discrete treatment-type variable. In this paper, therefore, we focus on the causal effect of changes in the federal funds target rate, which tends to move up or down in quarter-point jumps. Our empirical work is motivated by Romer and Romer's (2004) analysis of the FOMC decisions regarding the intended federal funds rate. This example is also used to make our theoretical framework concrete. In an earlier paper, Romer and Romer (1989) described monetary policy shocks using a dummy variable for monetary tightening. An application of our framework to this binary-treatment case appears in our working paper (Angrist & Kuersteiner, 2004) . Here we consider a more general model of the policy process where federal funds target rate changes are modeled as a dynamic multinomial process.
Propensity score methods, introduced by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) , are now widely used for cross-sectional causal inference in applied econometrics. Important empirical examples include Dehejia and Wahba (1999) and Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd (1998) , both concerned with the evaluation of training programs. Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd (1997) , Heckman et al. (1998) , and Abadie (2005) develop propensity score strategies for differences-in-differences estimators. The differences-in-differences framework often has a dynamic element since these models typically involve intertemporal comparisons. Similarly, Robins, Greenland, and Hu (1999) , Lok et al. (2004) , and Lechner (2004) have considered panel-type settings with time-varying treatments and sequential randomized trials. At the same time, few, if any, studies have considered propensity score methods for a pure time series application in spite of the fact that the dimension-reducing properties of propensity score estimators would seem especially attractive in a time series context. Finally, we note that Imbens (2000) and Lechner (2000) generalize the binary propensity score approach to allow ordered treatments, though this work has not yet featured widely in applications.
Implementation of our semiparametric test for conditional independence in time series data generates a number of inference problems. First, as in the cross-sectional and differences-in-differences settings discussed by Hahn (1998) , Heckman et al. (1998) , Hirano, Imbens, and Ridder (2003) , Abadie (2005) , and Abadie and Imbens (2009) , inference should allow for the fact that the propensity score is unknown and must be estimated. First-step estimation of the propensity score changes the limiting distribution of our Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) and von Mises (VM) test statistics.
A second and somewhat more challenging complication arises from the fact that nonparametric tests of distributional hypotheses such as conditional independence may have a nonstandard limiting distribution, even in a relatively simple cross-sectional setting. For example, in a paper closely related to ours, Linton and Gozalo (1999) consider KS-and VM-type statistics, as we do, but the limiting distributions of their test statistics are not asymptotically distribution free, and must therefore be bootstrapped. 1 More recently, Su and White (2003) have proposed a nonparametric conditional independence test for time series data based on orthogonality conditions obtained from an empirical likelihood specification. This procedure converges at a less-than-standard rate due to the need for nonparametric density estimation. In contrast, we present new KS and VM statistics that provide distribution-free tests for full conditional independence, are suitable for dependent data, and converge at the standard rate.
The key to our ability to improve on previous tests of conditional independence, and an added benefit of the propensity score approach, is that we are able to reduce the problem of testing for conditional distributional independence to a problem of testing for a martingale difference sequence (MDS) property of a certain functional of the data. This is related to the problem of testing for the MDS property in simple stochastic processes, a problem analyzed by, among others, Bierens (1982 Bierens ( , 1990 , Bierens and Ploberger (1997) , Chen and Fan (1999) , Stute, Thies, and Zhu (1998) , and Koul and Stute (1999) . Our testing problem is more complicated because we simultaneously test for the MDS property of a continuum of processes indexed in a function space. Earlier contributions propose a variety of schemes to find critical values for the limiting distribution of the resulting test statistics, but most of the existing procedures involve nuisance parameters. 2 Our work extends Koul and Stute (1999) by allowing more general forms of dependence, including mixing and conditional heteroskedasticity. These extensions are important in our application because even under the null hypothesis of no causal relationship, the observed time series are not Markovian and do not have a martingale difference structure. Most important, direct application of the Khmaladze (1988 Khmaladze ( , 1993 method in a multivariate context appears to work poorly in practice. We therefore use a Rosenblatt (1952) transformation of the data in addition to the Khmaladze transformation. 3 This combination of methods seems to perform well, at least for the low-dimensional multivariate systems explored here.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section outlines our conceptual framework, while section III provides a heuristic derivation of the testing strategy. Section IV discusses the construction of feasible critical values using the Khmaladze and Rosenblatt transforms, as well as a bootstrap procedure. Finally, the empirical behavior of alternative test statistics is illustrated through a re-analysis of the Romer and Romer (2004) data in section V. 4 As an alternative to the Romers' approach and to illustrate the use of our framework for specification testing, we also explore a model for monetary policy based on a simple Taylor rule. Appendix A extends the tests of section III to a general testing framework. Appendix B provides detailed descriptions on how to implement the test statistics. Appendix C summarizes theoretical results and technical assumptions. 5 Appendixes D and E contain model and data definitions for the empirical work in section V. An auxiliary appendix with data and additional information is available online at http://www.mitpressjournals.org /doi/suppl/10.1162/REST_a_00109.
II. Notation and Framework
Causal effects are defined here using the Rubin (1974) notion of potential outcomes. The potential outcomes concept originated in randomized trials but is now widely used in observational studies. Our definition of causality relies on the distinction between potential outcomes that would be realized with and without a change in policy. In the case of a binary treatment, these are denoted by Y 1t and Y 0t . The observed outcome in period t can then be written
where D t is treatment status. In the absence of serial correlation or covariates, the causal effect of a treatment or policy action is defined as Y 1t − Y 0t . Since only one or the other potential outcome can ever be observed, researchers typically focus on the average causal effect,
When D t takes on more than two values, there are multiple incremental average treatment effects (for example, the effect of going up or down). This is spelled out further below.
Time series data are valuable in that, by definition, a time series sample consists of repeated observations on the subject of interest (typically a country or economy). At the 3 In recent work, independent of ours, Delgado and Stute (2008) discuss a specification test that also combines the Khmaladze and Rosenblatt transforms. Song (2009) considers a nonparametric test (as opposed to our semiparametric test) of conditional independence using the Rosenblatt transform. In Song's setup, parameter estimation involving conditioning variables does not affect the limiting distribution of test statistics. This eliminates the need for the Khmaladze transform. 4 A small Monte Carlo study can be found in our NBER working paper: Angrist and Kuersteiner (2004) . 5 Proofs are available in the online appendix. same time, time series application poses special problems for causal inference. In a dynamic setting, the definition of causal effects is complicated by the fact that potential outcomes are determined not just by current policy actions but also by past actions, lagged outcomes, and covariates. To capture dynamics, we assume the economy can be described by an observed vector stochastic process,
where Y t is a vector of outcome variables, D t is a vector of policy variables, and X t is a vector of other exogenous and (lagged) endogenous variables that are not part of the null hypothesis of no causal effect of D t . LetX t = (X t , . . . , X t−k , . . .) denote the covariate path, with similar definitions forȲ t andD t . Formally, the relevant information is assumed to be described
is a sequence of finite-dimensional functions of the entire observable history of the joint process. For the purposes of our empirical work, the mapping Π t and z t are assumed to be known.
A key to identification in our framework is the distinction between systematic and random components in the process by which policy is determined. Specifically, decisions about policy are assumed to be determined in part by a possibly time-varying but nonstochastic function of observed random variables, denoted D(z t , t). This function summarizes the role played by observable variables in the policymakers' decision-making process. In addition, policymakers are assumed to react to idiosyncratic information, represented by the scalar ε t , that is not observed by researchers and therefore modeled as a stochastic shock. The policy D t is determined by both observed and unobserved variables according to D t = ψ(D(z t , t), ε t , t), where ψ is a general mapping. Without loss of generality, we can assume that ε t has a uniform distribution on [0, 1]. This is because ψ(a, b, t) can always be defined asψ(a, F −1 (b), t), where F is any parametric or nonparametric distribution function. We assume that ψ takes values in the set of functions, Ψ t . A common specification in the literature on monetary policy is a Taylor (1993) rule for the nominal interest rate. In this case, ψ is usually linear, while z t is lagged inflation and unemployment (see Rotemberg & Woodford, 1997) . A linear rule implicitly determines the distribution of ε t .
A second key assumption is that the stochastic component of the policy function, ε t , is independent of potential outcomes. This assumption is distinct from the policy model itself and therefore discussed separately below. Given this setup, we can define potential outcomes as the possibly counterfactual realizations of Y t that would arise in response to a hypothetical change in policy as described by alternative realizations for ψ(D(z t , t), ε t , t). Our definition of potential outcomes allows counterfactual outcomes to vary with changes in policy realizations for a given policy rule or for a changing policy rule:
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The random variable Y ψ t,j (d) depends in part on future policy shocks such as ε t+j−1 , that is, random shocks that occur between time t and t + j. When we imagine changing d or ψ to generate potential outcomes, this sequence of intervening shocks is held fixed. This is consistent with the tradition of impulse response analysis in macroeconomics. Our setup is more general, however, in that it allows the distributional properties of Y ψ t,j (d) to depend on the policy parameter d in arbitrary ways. In contrast, traditional impulse response analysis looks at the effect of d on the mean of Y ψ t,j (d) only. 6 It also bears emphasizing that both the timing of policy adoption and the horizon matter for Under the null hypothesis of no causal effect, potential and realized outcomes coincide. This is formalized in the next definition: In the situation that Rubin (1974) studied, the no-effects null hypothesis states that Y 0t = Y 1t . 7 Our approach to causality testing leaves Y ψ t,j (d) unspecified. In contrast, it is common practice in econometrics to model the joint distribution of the vector of outcomes and policy variables (χ t ) as a function of lagged and exogenous variables or innovations in variables. It is therefore worth thinking about what potential outcomes would be in this case.
We begin with an example based on Bernanke and Blinder's (1992) SVAR model of monetary transmission (see also Bernanke & Mihov, 1998) . This example illustrates how potential outcomes can be computed explicitly in simple linear models and the link between observed and potential outcomes under the no-effects null. White (2006 White ( , 2009 ) develops a potential outcomes model for causal effects in a dynamic context. In contrast to our approach, White is concerned with the causal effect of policy sequences rather than individual policy shocks. White also discusses estimation of policy effects (as opposed to our focus on testing), but imposes stronger assumptions on the model-relating outcomes and policies than we do. 7 In a study of sequential randomized trials, Robins, Greenland, and Hu (1999) define potential outcome Y (0) t as the outcome that would be observed in the absence of any current and past interventions, that is, when D t = D t−1 = . . . = 0. They denote by Y (1) t the set of values that would be observed if for all i ≥ 0, D t−i = 1. This approach seems too restrictive to fit the macroeconomic policy experiments we have in mind.
Example 1. The economic environment is described by an
is a matrix of constants conformable to χ t and Γ(L) = Γ 1 L + . . . + Γ p L p is a lag polynomial such that C(L) ≡ (Γ 0 + Γ(L)) −1 = ∞ k=0 C k L k exists. Policy innovations are denoted by ε t , and other structural innovations are called η t . Then, χ t = C(L)(η t , ε t ) , such that Y t has a moving average representation,
where c yε,k and c yη,k are blocks of C k partitioned conformably to Y t , ε t , and η t . In this setup, potential outcomes are defined as
These potential outcomes answer the following question: Assume that everything else equal, which in this case means keeping ε t+j−k and η t+j−k fixed for k = j, how would the outcome variable Y t+j change if we change the period-t policy innovation from ε t to d? The sharp null hypothesis of no causal effect holds if and only if c yε,j = 0 for all j. This is the familiar restriction that the impulse response function be identically equal to 0. 8 When economic theory provides a model for χ t , as in DSGE models, there is a direct relationship between potential outcomes and the solution of the model. As in Blanchard and Kahn (1980) or Sims (2001) , a solutionχ t =χ t (ε t ,η t ) is a representation of χ t as a function of past structural innovationsε t = (ε t , ε t−1 , . . .) in the policy function and structural innovationsη t = (η t , η t−1 , . . .) in the rest of the economy. Further assuming that ψ(D(z t , t), ε t , t) = d can be solved for ε t such that for some function ψ * , ε t = ψ * (D(z t , t), d, t), we can then partitionχ t = (Ỹ t ,X t ,D t ) and d, t) ,ε t−1 ,η t+j ). 9 It is worth pointing out that the solutionχ t , and thus the potential outcome, Y ψ t,j (d), depend both on D(., .) and on the distribution of ε t . With linear models, a closed form forχ t can be derived. Given such a functional relationship, Y ψ t,j (d) can be computed in a straightforward manner. 10 Definition 1 extends the conventional potential outcome framework in a number of important ways. A key assumption t) . However, the function ψ * need not exist. Then it may be more convenient to index potential outcomes as functions of ε t rather than d. In this case, one could define Y ψ t,j (e) =Ỹ t+j (ε t+j , . . . ε t+1 , e,ε t−1 ,η t ), where we use e instead of d to emphasize the difference in definition. This distinction does not matter for our purposes, so we focus on Y ψ t,j (d). 10 New Keynesian monetary models have multiple equilibria under certain interest rate targeting rules. Lubik and Schorfheide (2003) provide an algorithm to compute potential outcomes for linear rational expectations models with multiple equilibria. Multiplicity of equilibria is compatible with definition 2 as long as the multiplicity disappears under the null hypothesis of no causal effects. Moreover, uniqueness of equilibria under the no-effects null need hold only for the componentỸ t (ε t ,η t ) ofχ t = (Ỹ t ,X t ,D t ).
in the cross-sectional causal framework is noninterference between units, or what Rubin (1978) calls the stable unit treatment value assumption (SUTVA). Thus, in a cross-sectional context, the treatment received by one subject is assumed to have no causal effect on the outcomes of others. The overall proportion treated is also taken to be irrelevant. For a number of reasons, SUTVA may fail in a time series setup. First, because the units in a time series context are serially correlated, current outcomes depend on past policies. This problem is accounted for here by conditioning on the history of observed policies, covariates, and outcomes, so that in practice, potential outcomes reference alternative states of the world that might be realized for a given history. Second, and more important, since the outcomes of interest are often assumed to be equilibrium values, potential outcomes may depend on the distribution-and hence all possible realizations-of the unobserved component of policy decisions, ε t . The dependence of potential outcomes on the distribution of ε t is captured by ψ. Finally, the fact that potential outcomes depend on ψ allows them to depend directly on the decision-making rule policymakers use even when policy realizations are fixed. Potential outcomes can therefore be defined in a rational-expectations framework where both the distribution of shocks and policymakers' reaction to these shocks matter.
The framework up to this point defines causal effects in terms of unrealized counterfactual outcomes. In practice, of course, we obtain only one realization each period and cannot directly test the noncausality null. Our tests therefore rely on the identification condition below, referred to in the cross-section treatment effects literature as "ignorability" or "selection-on-observables." This condition allows us to establish a link between potential outcomes and the distribution of observed random variables. Assumption 1. Selection on observables:
The selection on observables assumption says that policies are independent of potential outcomes after appropriate conditioning. Note also that assumption 1 implies that
This is because, conditional on z t , randomness in D t is due exclusively to randomness in ε t . We think of ε t as shorthand for idiosyncratic factors such as those detailed for monetary policy by Romer and Romer (2004) . These factors include variation over time in policymakers' beliefs about the workings of the economy, decision makers' tastes and goals, political factors, the temporary pursuit of objectives other than changes in the outcomes of interest (for example, monetary policy that targets exchange rates instead of inflation or unemployment), and harder-to-quantify factors such as the mood and character of decision makers. Conditional on observables, this idiosyncratic variation is taken to be independent of potential future outcomes.
Substituting observed for potential outcomes in assumption 1 produces the key testable conditional independence assumption:
(1)
In other words, conditional on observed covariates and lagged outcomes, there should be no relationship between treatment and outcomes. Assumption 1 plays a central role in the applied literature on testing the effects of monetary policy. For example, Bernanke and Blinder (1992) , Gordon and Leeper (1994) , Christiano et al. (1996 Christiano et al. ( , 1999 , and Bernanke and Mihov (1998) assume a block recursive structure to identify policy shocks. In terms of example 1, this is equivalent to imposing a set of zero restrictions on the coefficients in Γ 0 corresponding to the policy variables D t in the equations for Y t and X t (see Bernanke & Mihov, 1998) . Together with the assumption that ε t and η t are independent of each other and over time, this implies assumption 1. To see this, note that conditional on z t , the distribution of D t depends only on ε t , which is independent of the history of shocks that determine potential outcomes. Christiano et al. (1999) discuss a variety of SVAR specifications that use recursive identification. The key assumption here is that an instantaneous response of conditioning variables to policy shocks can be ruled out a priori.
Tests based on equation (1) can be seen as testing a restriction similar to the generalized version of Sims causality introduced by Chamberlain (1982) . A natural question is how this relates to the Granger causality tests widely used in empirical work. Note that if X t can be subsumed into the vec- Chamberlain (1982) and Florens and Mouchart (1982, 1985) show that under plausible regularity conditions, this is equivalent to generalized Granger noncausality:
( 2 )
In the more general case, however, D t potentially causes X t+1 , soX t cannot be subsumed intoȲ t . Therefore, equation (1) does not imply
The fact that Sims and Granger causality are not generally equivalent was shown for the case of linear processes by Dufour and Tessier (1993) . 11 We summarize the nonequivalence of Sims and Granger causality in the following theorem: 730 THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS Theorem 1. Let χ t be a stochastic process defined on a probability space (Ω, F, P) as before, assuming also that conditional probability measures Pr(Y t+1 , D t |z t ) are well defined ∀t except possibly on a set of measure zero. Then equation (1) does not imply equation (3), and equation (3) does not imply equation (1).
The intuition for the Granger/Sims distinction is that while Sims causality looks forward only at outcomes, the Granger causality relation conditions on potentially endogenous responses to policy shocks and other disturbances. Even if the conditional independence assumption holds, the Granger test can be systematically misleading for the same reason that control for endogenous variables (that is, other outcomes) complicates any kind of causal inference. 12 Is the distinction between Granger and Sims causality empirically relevant in the money and income context? In research on monetary policy, Shapiro (1994) and Leeper (1997) argue that lagged inflation should be in the conditioning set in attempts to isolate the causal effect of monetary policy innovations. Suppose Y t is output, X t is inflation, and D t is a proxy for monetary policy. Suppose also that inflation is the only reason money affects output. In this case, Granger tests may fail to detect a causal link between monetary policy and output, while Sims tests should detect this relationship. One way to understand this difference is through the impulse response function, which shows that Sims looks for an effect of structural innovations in policy (ε Dt ). In contrast, Granger noncausality is formulated as a restriction on the relation between output and all lagged variables, including covariates like inflation that themselves have responded to the policy shock of interest. Granger causality tests therefore give the wrong answer to a question that Sims causality tests answer correctly: Will output change in response to random manipulation of monetary policy?
The nonequivalence of Granger and Sims causality has important operational consequences: equation (3) is easily tested by regressing Y t+1 on lags of D t , Y t , and X t , at least when functional form assumptions are imposed. While some implications of equation (1) can also be tested relatively easily with parametric models, full testing equation (1) can be more challenging unless D t , Y t , and X t can be nested in a linear dynamic model such as an SVAR. One of the main contributions of this paper is to relax linearity assumptions implicitly imposed on Y ψ t,j (d) by SVAR or regression models and allow unrestricted nonlinearities in the policy function.
In the remainder of the paper, we assume the policy variable of interest is multinomial. This is in the spirit of research focusing on Federal Reserve decisions regarding changes in the federal funds rate, which are by nature discrete (Hamilton & Jordà, 2002) . Typically changes come in widely publicized movements up or down, usually in multiples of 25 basis points if nonzero. As Romer and Romer (2004) noted, the Federal Reserve has set interest rate targets for most of the period since 1969, even when targeting was not as explicit as it is today. The discrete nature of monetary policy decisions leads naturally to a focus on the propensity score, the conditional probability of a rate change (or a change of a certain magnitude or sign). 13 Under the noncausality null hypothesis, it follows that
A Sims-type test of the null hypothesis can therefore be obtained by augmenting the policy function p(z t , θ 0 ) with future outcome variables. This test has the correct size, though it will not have power against all alternatives. Below, we explore simple parametric Sims-type tests constructed by augmenting the policy function with future outcomes. Our main objective, however, is the use of the propensity score to develop a flexible class of semiparametric conditional independence tests that can be used to test both specific and general alternatives.
A natural substantive question at this point is what should go in the conditioning set for the policy propensity score and how this should be modeled. In practice, Fed policy is commonly modeled as being driven by a few observed variables like inflation and lagged output growth. Examples include Romer and Romer (1989 and others inspired by their work. 14 The fact that D t is multinomial in our application also suggests that multinomial logit and probit provide a natural functional form. A motivating example that seems especially relevant in this context is Shapiro (1994) , who developed a parsimonious probit model of Fed decision making as a function of net present value measures of inflation and unemployment. 15 Importantly, while it is impossible to know for sure whether a given set of conditioning variables is adequate, our framework suggests a simple diagnostic test that can be used to decide when the model for the policy propensity score is consistent with the data.
III. Semiparametric Conditional Independence Tests
Using the Propensity Score
We are interested in testing the conditional independence restriction y t ⊥D t |z t , where y t takes values in R k 1 and z t takes values in R k 2 with k 1 + k 2 = k. Typically y t = (Y t+1 , . . . , Y t+m ) , but we can also focus on particular future outcomes, say, y t = Y t+m , when causal effects are thought to be delayed by m periods.
Pr(D t = i|z t ) = 1, the conditional independence hypothesis can be written as a collection of M nonredundant moment conditions:
We use the shorthand notation p i (z t ) = Pr(D t = i|z t ) and assume that p i (z t ) = p i (z t , θ) is known up to a parameter θ. This is the policy propensity score. We also assume that p(z t , θ 0 ) does not depend on t (in practice, z t might include time dummies). In an SVAR framework, p(z t , θ 0 ) corresponds to the SVAR policy determination equation. In the recursive identification schemes discussed earlier, this equation can be estimated separately from the system. Our method differs in two important respects: we do not assume a linear relationship between D t and z t , and we do not need to model the elements of z t as part of a larger system of simultaneous equations. This increases robustness and saves degrees of freedom relative to a conventional SVAR analysis. A convenient representation of the hypotheses we are testing can be obtained by noting that under the null,
These moment conditions can be written compactly in vector notation. We define M×1 vectors D t = (1(D t = 1), . . . , 1(D t = M)) and
so that the moment conditions (5) can be expressed as
This leads to a simple interpretation of our test statistics as looking for a relation between policy innovations, D t − p(z t ), and the distribution of future outcomes. Note also that like the Hirano et al. (2003) and Abadie (2005) propensityscore-weighted estimators and the Robins, Mark, and Newey (1992) partially linear estimator, test statistics constructed from moment condition (5) work directly with the propensity score; no matching step or nonparametric smoothing is required once estimates of the score have been constructed. We define U t = (y t , z t ) so that equation (6) can be expressed in terms of a collection of unconditional moment conditions. Thus, testing equation (6) is equivalent to testing the unconditional moment condition E[1(U t ≤ v)(D t − p(z t ))] = 0 over all possible values of v. Appendix A presents a more general class of tests based on general test functions, φ(U t , v) and not just indicators.
In our empirical application, D t indicates situations where the Fed raises, lowers, or leaves the interest rates unchanged. Note that in our framework, interest rate increases may have causal effects, even if decreases do not (and vice versa). This possibility is explored by looking at individual moment conditions,
for specific choices of i.
An implication of equation (6) is that the average policy effect is 0:
In practice, the unconditional moment restriction (7) may be of greater interest than full conditional independence. Tests based on an unconditional restriction may also be more powerful.
The framework outlined here produces a specification test for the policy model. In particular, if the specifica-
We use tests based on equation (8) to validate the empirical specification of p(z t ).
Equation (5) shows that the hypothesis of conditional independence, whether formulated directly or for conditional moments, is equivalent to an MDS hypothesis for a certain empirical process. The moment condition in equation (5) implies that for any fixed v 1 , 1(y t ≤ v 1 )(D t − p(z t )) is an MDS. Our test is a joint test of whether the set of all processes indexed by v 1 ∈ R k 1 has the MDS property. We call this a functional martingale difference hypothesis. The functional MDS hypothesis test extends an idea in Koul and Stute (1999) . One way in which our more general null hypothesis differs from their MDS test is that the dimension k of v is at least 2, while their simple MDS hypothesis is formulated for scalar v. 16 To move from population moment conditions to the sample, we start by defining the empirical process,
Under regularity conditions that include stationarity of the observed process, we show in an online appendix that V n (v) 732 THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS converges weakly to a limiting mean-zero Gaussian process
where v, τ ∈ R k . 17 Using the fact that under the null,
where diag(p(u 2 )) is the diagonal matrix with diagonal ele- 
with the limiting distribution of these statistics under the null hypothesis. Implementation of statistics based on V n (v) requires a set of appropriate critical values. Construction of critical values is complicated by two factors affecting the limiting distribution of V n (v). One is the dependence of the limiting distribution of V n (v) on F u (v), which induces data-dependent correlation in the process V n (v). Hence, the nuisance parameter Γ(v, τ) appears in the limiting distribution. This is handled in two ways. First, critical values for the limiting distribution of V n (v) are computed numerically, conditional on the sample in a way that accounts for the covariance structure Γ(v, τ).
(We discuss this procedure in section IV C). An alternative to numerical computation is to transform V n (v) to a standard Gaussian process on the k-dimensional unit cube, following Rosenblatt (1952) . The advantage of this approach is that asymptotic critical values can be based on standardized tables that depend on only the dimension k and the function φ, but not on the distribution of U t and thus not on the sample. We discuss how to construct these tables numerically in section V.
The second factor that affects the limiting distribution of V n (v) is the fact that the unknown parameter θ needs to be estimated. We use the notationV n (v) to denote test statistics that are based on an estimate,θ. Section IV discusses a 17 It seems likely that stationarity can be relaxed to allow some distributional heterogeneity over time. But unit root and trend nonstationarity are not easily accommodated in our framework because the martingale transformations in section IVA rely on Gaussian limit distributions. Park and Phillips (2000) develop a powerful limiting theory for the binary choice model when the explanatory variables have a unit root. Phillips (2002a, 2002b) extend Park and Phillips to the multinomial case and apply it to the federal. The question of how to adapt these results to the problem of conditional independence testing is left for future work. martingale transform proposed by Khmaladze (1988 Khmaladze ( , 1993 to remove the effects of variability inV n (v) stemming from estimation of θ. The corrected test statistic has the same limiting distribution as V n (v). Thus, in a second step, critical values that are valid for V n (v) can be used to carry out tests based on the transformed version ofV n (v).
The combined application of the Rosenblatt and Khmaladze transforms leads to an asymptotically pivotal test. Pivotal statistics have the practical advantage of comparability across data sets because the critical values for these statistics are not data dependent. In addition to these practical advantages, bootstrapped pivotal statistics usually promise an asymptotic refinement (see Hall, 1992) .
IV. Implementation
As a first step, letV n (v) denote the empirical process of interest where p(z t , θ) is replaced by p(z t ,θ) and the estimator θ is assumed to satisfy the following asymptotic linearity property:
More detailed assumptions for the propensity score model are contained in conditions 5 and 6 in appendix C. In our context, l(D t , z t , θ) is the score for the maximum likelihood estimator of the propensity score model. To develop a structure that can be used to account for the variability inV n (v) induced by the estimation of θ, define the function
It therefore follows thatV n (v) can be approximated by V n (v) −ṁ(v, θ 0 )n −1/2 n t=1 l(D t , z t , θ 0 ). The empirical pro-cessV n (v) converges to a limiting processV (v) with covariance function
, as shown in the online appendix. Next we turn to details of the transformations. First we outline a Khmaladze-type martingale transformation that correctsV (v) for the effect of estimation of θ. We then discuss the problem of obtaining asymptotically distribution free limits for the resulting process. This problem is straightforward when v is a scalar, but extensions to higher dimensions are somewhat more involved.
A. Khmaladze Transform
The object here is to define a linear operator T with the property that the transformed process, W (v) = TV (v), is a mean zero Gaussian process with covariance function Γ(v, τ).
WhileV (v) has a complicated data-dependent limiting distribution (because of the estimated θ), the transformed process W (v) has the same distribution as V (v) and can be handled more easily in statistical applications. Khmaladze (1981 Khmaladze ( , 1988 Khmaladze ( , 1993 introduced the operator T in a series of papers exploring limiting distributions of empirical processes with possibly parametric means.
When v ∈ R, the Khmaladze transform can be given some intuition. First, note that V (v) has independent increments
, we can understand the Khmaladze transform as being based on the insight that becauseV (v) is a Gaussian process,
has independent increments. The Khmaladze transform thus removes the conditional mean of the innovation ΔV . When v ∈ R k with k > 1 as in our application, this simple construction cannot be trivially extended because increments of V (v) in different directions of v are no longer independent. Khmaladze (1988) showed that careful specification of the conditioning set F v is necessary to overcome this problem.
Following Khmaladze (1993) 
We then define the inner product,
and, for
define the matrix:
We note that the process V (v) can be represented in terms of a vector of Gaussian processes b(v) with covariance function
where d(π λl (., θ) ) is the total derivative of π λl (., θ) with respect to λ. We show in the online appendix that the process W (v) is zero mean Gaussian and has covariance function Γ(v, τ).
The transform above differs from that in Khmaladze (1993) and Koul and Stute (1999) in thatl(v, θ) is different from the optimal score function that determines the estimatorθ. The reason is that here, H(v) is not a conventional cumulative distribution function as in these papers. Also, unlike Koul and Stute (1999) , we make no conditional homoskedasticity assumptions. 18 Khmaladze (1993, lemma 2.5) shows that tests based on W (v) and V (v) have the same local power against a certain class of local alternatives that are orthogonal to the score process l(., θ 0 ). The reason for this result is that T is a norm-preserving mapping (see Khmaladze, 1993 , lemmas 3.4 and 3.10). The fact that local power is unaffected by the transformation T also implies that the choice of {A λ } has no consequence for local power as long as A λ satisfies the regularity conditions outlined above.
To construct the test statistic proposed in the theoretical discussion, we must deal with the fact that the transformation T is unknown and needs to be replaced by an estimator T n . This is obtained by replacing p(u 2 ) with p(u 2 ,θ), H(u) witĥ H n (u), C λ withĈ λ , andV withV n in equation (14). Then T n can be written aŝ
withV n (π ⊥ λl (.,θ) ) = n −1/2 n s=1 π ⊥ λl (U s ,θ) (D s − p(z s ,θ)) and the empirical distributionĤ n (u) andĈ λ are defined in appendix B.
The transformed test statistic depends on the choice of the sets A λ although, as we have pointed out, the choice of A λ does not affect local power. Computational convenience thus becomes a key criterion in selecting A λ . Here we focus on sets
which lead to test statistics with simple closed-form expressions. Denote the first element of y t by y 1t . Then equation (15) can be expressed more explicitly aŝ
In theorem 2 of Appendix C, we show thatŴ n (v) converges weakly to W (v). In the next section, we show how a further 734 THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS transformation can be applied that leads to a distribution-free limit for the test statistics.
B. Rosenblatt Transform
The implementation strategy discussed above has improved operational characteristics when the data are modified using a transformation that Rosenblatt (1952) proposed. This transformation produces a multivariate distribution that is i.i.d. on the k-dimensional unit cube and therefore leads to a test that can be based on standardized tables. Let U t = [U t1 , . . . , U tk ], and define the transformation Rosenblatt (1952) shows that the random vector w t = T R (U t ) has a joint marginal distribution that is uniform and independent on [0, 1] k .
Using the Rosenblatt transformation, we define
Also, the test statistic V n (v) becomes the marked process: V w,n (w) = n −1/2 n t=1 m w (w t , D t , θ|w). Rosenblatt (1952) notes that tests using T R are generally not invariant to the ordering of the vector w t because T R is not invariant under such permutations. 19 We denote by V w (v) the limit of V w,n (v) and byV w (v) the limit ofV w,n (v), which is the process obtained by replacing θ withθ in V w,n (v). Define the transform T wVw (w) as before by 20
1{. ≤ w}, dπ λlw (., θ) C −1 w,λV w π ⊥ λl w (., θ) . (18) 19 In the working paper (Angrist & Kuersteiner, 2004) , we discuss ways to resolve the problem of the ordering in w t . Of course, the general form of our test statistic also depends on the choice of φ(., .), as outlined in appendix A. This sort of dependence on the details of implementation is a common feature of consistent specification tests. From a practical point of view, it seems natural to fix φ(., .) using judgments about features of the data where deviations from conditional independence are likely to be easiest to detect (for example, moments). In contrast, the w t ordering is inherently arbitrary 20 For a more detailed derivation, see appendix B.
Finally, to convert W w (w) to a process that is asymptotically distribution free, we apply a modified version of the final transformation proposed by Khmaladze (1988) to the process W (v). In particular, using the notation W w (1{. ≤ w}) = W w (w) to emphasize the dependence of W on 1{. ≤ w} and defining
it follows from the previous discussion that
is a Gaussian process with covariance function w ∧ w . In practice, w t = T R (U t ) is unknown because T R depends on unknown conditional distribution functions. In order to estimate T R , we introduce the kernel function K k (x) where K k (x) is a higher-order kernel satisfying condition 8 in appendix C. A simple way of constructing higher-order kernels is given in Bierens (1987) 
) . An estimateŵ t of w t is then obtained from the recursionŝ
We defineŴ w,n (w) = T w,nVw,n (w) where T w,n is the empirical version of the Khmaladze transform applied to the vector w t . LetŴŵ ,n (w) denote the processŴ w,n (w) where w t has been replaced withŵ t . For a detailed formulation of this statistic, see appendix B. An estimate of h w (w) is defined aŝ h w (.) = (diag(p(.,θ)) − p(.,θ)p (.,θ) ).
The empirical version of the transformed statistic iŝ
Bŵ ,n (w) =Ŵŵ ,n (1{. ≤ w}ĥ w (.) −1/2 )
CAUSAL θ) ). Finally, theorem 3 in appendix C formally establishes that the processBŵ ,n (v) converges to a Gaussian process with covariance function equal to the uniform distribution on [0, 1] k .
Note that the convergence rate ofBŵ ,n (v) to a limiting random variable does not depend on the dimension k or the bandwidth sequence m n . Theorem 3 shows thatBŵ ,n (w) ⇒ B w (w), where B w (w) is a standard Gaussian process. The set Υ [0,1] is defined as Υ [0,1] = {w ∈ Υ ε |w = π x w}, where Υ ε is a compact subset of the interior of [0, 1] k with volume 1 − ε for some ε > 0, π x w = 1(w ∈ A x )w for some fixed x ∈ R and A x is the set defined in equation (16). The restriction to Υ [0,1] is needed to avoid problems of invertibility ofĈ −1 w . It thus follows that transformed versions of the VM and KS statistics converge to functionals of B w (w). These results can be stated formally as (20) and
Here VM w and KS w are the VM and KS statistics after both the Khmaladze and Rosenblatt transforms have been applied toV n (v). In practice the integral in equation (20) and the supremum in equation (21) can be computed over a discrete grid. The asymptotic representations (20) and (21) make it possible to use asymptotic statistical tables. For the purposes of the empirical application below, we computed critical values for the VM statistic. These critical values depend only on the dimension k and are thus distribution free.
C. Bootstrap-Based Critical Values
In addition to tests based on critical values computed using asymptotic formulas, we also experimented with bootstrap critical values for the raw statistic,V n (v), and the transformed statistic,Bŵ ,n (w). This provides a check on the asymptotic formulas and gives some independent evidence on the advantages of the transformed statistic. Also, because the transformed statistic has a distribution-free limit, we can expect an asymptotic refinement: tests based on bootstrapped critical values for this statistic should have a more accurate size than bootstrap tests usingV n (v).
Our implementation of the bootstrap is similar to a procedure described by Chen and Fan (1999) and Hansen (1996) , a version of the wild bootstrap called conditional Monte Carlo. This procedure seems especially well suited to time series data since it provides a simple strategy to preserve dependent data structures under resampling. Following Mammen (1993) , the wild bootstrap error distribution is constructed by sampling ε * t,s for s = 1, . . . , S bootstrap replications according to
where ε * * t,s ∼ N(0, 1) is independent of the sample. Let the moment condition underlying the transformed test statistic (19) be denoted by
and writê
to denote the test statistic in a bootstrap replication, with m n;T (v,θ) = n −1 n t=1 m T ,t (v,θ) . The distribution of ε * t,s induced by equation (22) guarantees that the first three empirical moments of m T ,t (v,θ) −m n;T (v,θ) are preserved in bootstrap samples. Theorem 4 in appendix C shows that the asymptotic distribution ofBŵ ,n (w) under the null hypothesis is the same as the asymptotic distribution ofB * w,n (w) conditional on the data. This implies that critical values forBŵ ,n (w) can be computed as follows: Bŵ ,n (w) 2 dw.
Bootstrap critical values for the untransformed statistic are based in an equivalent way on S bootstrap samples of
wherem n (v,θ) = n −1 n t=1 m(y t , D t , z t ,θ; v) and ε * t,s is generated in the same way as before.
V. Causal Effects of Monetary Policy Shocks Revisited
We use the machinery developed here to test for the effects of monetary policy with data from Romer and Romer (2004) . The monetary policy variable in this context is the change in the FOMC's intended federal funds rate. This rate is derived from the narrative record of FOMC meetings and internal Federal Reserve memos. The conditioning variables for selection-on-observables identification are derived from Federal Reserve forecasts of the growth rate of real GDP, the 736 THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS GDP deflator, and the unemployment rate, as well as a few contemporaneous variables and lags. The relevant forecasts were prepared by Federal Reserve researchers and are called Greenbook forecasts.
The key identifying assumption in this context is that, conditional on Greenbook forecasts and a handful of other variables, including lagged policy variables, changes in the intended federal funds target rate are independent of potential outcomes (in this case, the monthly percentage change in industrial production). Romer and Romer's (2004) detailed economic and institutional analysis of the monetary policymaking process makes their data and framework an ideal candidate for an investigation of causal policy effects using the policy propensity score. 21 In much of the period since the mid-1970s, and especially in the Greenspan era, the FOMC targeted the funds rate explicitly. Romer and Romer argue, however, that even in the pre-Greenspan era, when the FOMC targeted the funds rate less closely, the central bank's intentions can be read from the documentary record. Moreover, the information that the FOMC used to make policy decisions is now available to researchers. The propensity score approach begins with a statistical model predicting the intended federal funds rate as a function of the publicly available information that the FOMC used.
The propensity score approach contrasts with SVAR-type identification strategies of the sort used by (among others) Bernanke and Blinder (1992) , Bernanke, Boivin, and Eliasz (2005) , Christiano et al. (1996) , Cochrane (1994) , and Leeper, Sims, and Zha (1996) . In this work, identification turns on a fully articulated model of the macroeconomy, as well as a reasonably good approximation of the policymaking process. One key difference between the propensity score approach developed here and the SVAR literature is that in the latter, policy variables and covariates entering the policy equation may also be endogenous variables. Identifying assumptions about how policy innovations are transmitted are then required to disentangle the causal effects of monetary policy from other effects.
Our approach is closer in spirit to the recursive identification strategy that Christiano et al. (1999) , used (hereafter CEE). Like ours, the CEE study makes the central bank's policy function a key element in an analysis of monetary policy effects. Important differences, however, are that CEE formulate a monetary policy equation in terms of the actual federal funds rate and nonborrowed reserves and that they include contemporaneous values of real GDP, the GDP deflator, and commodity prices as covariates. These variables are determined in part by market forces and are therefore potentially endogenous. For example, Sims and Zha (2006) argue that monetary aggregates and the producer price index are endogenous because of an immediate effect of monetary policy shocks on producer prices. In contrast, the intended funds 21 Romer and Romer (2004) can be seen as a response to critiques of Romer and Romer (1989) by Leeper (1997) and Shapiro (1994) . These critics argued that monetary policy is forward-looking in a way that induces omitted variables bias in the regressions of Romer and Romer (1989) . rate used here is determined by forecasts of market conditions based on predetermined variables and is therefore sequentially exogenous by construction. Finally, the CEE approach is parametric and relies on linear models for both outcomes and policy variables.
The substantive identifying assumption in our framework (as in Romer & Romer, 2004) is that, conditional on the information used by the FOMC and now available to outside researchers (such as Greenbook forecasts), changes in the intended funds rate are essentially idiosyncratic or "as good as randomly assigned." At the same time, we do not really know how best to model the policy propensity score; even maintaining the set of covariates, lag length is uncertain, for example. We therefore experiment with variations on Romer and Romer's original specification. We also consider an alternative somewhat less institutionally grounded model based on a simple Taylor rule. Our Taylor specification is motivated by Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) .
Our reanalysis of the Romer data uses a discretized version of changes in the intended federal funds rate. Specifically, to allow for asymmetric policy effects while keeping the model parsimonious, we treat policy as having three values: up, down, or no change. The change in the intended federal funds rate is denoted by dff t and the discretized change by dDff t . For 29% of the monthly observations in our data, the intended funds rate fell, for 32% it rose, and the rest of time the intended rate was unchanged. 22 Following Hamilton and Jordà (2002) , we fit ordered probit models with dDff t as the dependent variable; this formulation can be motivated by a linear latent-index model of central banker intentions.
The first specification we report on, which we call baseline Romer model (a), uses the variables from Romer and Romer's (2004) policy model as controls, with the modifications that the lagged level of the intended funds rate is replaced by the lagged change in the intended federal funds rate and the unemployment level is replaced by the unemployment innovation. 23 Our modifications are motivated in part by a concern that the lagged intended rate and the unemployment level are nonstationary. In addition, the lagged change in the intended federal funds rate captures the fact that the FOMC often acts in a sequence of small steps. This results in higher predicted probabilities of a change in the same direction conditional on past changes. A modified specification, constructed by dropping regressors without significant effects, leads to restricted Romer model (b). To allow for nonlinear dynamic responses, lag-quadratic Romer model (c) adds a quadratic function of past intended changes in the federal funds rate to restricted Romer model (b) . We also consider versions of models (a) to (c) using a discretized variable for the lagged change in the intended federal funds rate. Romer models with discrete baseline are labeled (d), (e), and (f).
As an alternative to the policy model based on Romer and Romer (2004) , we consider a Taylor-type model similar to the one that Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) used. The Taylor models have dDff t as the dependent variable in an ordered probit model, as before. The covariates in this case consist of two lags of dff t , nine lags of the growth rate of real GDP, and nine lags of the monthly inflation rate. 24 This baseline Taylor specification is labeled model g. We also consider a modification replacing dff t−2 with (dff t−1 ) 2 to capture nonlinearities in lag-quadratic Taylor model (h). Finally, we look at Taylor models with discrete baseline controls, replacing lags of dff t with the corresponding lags of dDff t . These versions of models (g) and (h) are labeled models (i) and (j).
As a benchmark for our semiparametric analysis, we begin with parametric Sims-type causality tests. These are simple parametric tests of the null hypothesis of no causal effect of monetary policy shocks on outcome variables, constructed by augmenting ordered probit models for the propensity score with future outcome variables. Under the null hypothesis of no causal effect, future outcome variables should have insignificant coefficients in the policy model. This is the essence of equation (1) and assumption 1. Table 1 reports results from parametric Sims tests for the effect of policy on industrial production. The table shows t-statistics and significance levels for the coefficient on the cumulated change in the log of the nonseasonally adjusted index of industrial production, cIP t+k , up to three years ahead. More specifically, each row in table 1 corresponds to separately estimated augmented ordered probit models p((z t , cIP t+k ), θ) for values of k up to twelve quarter leads. The variables z t are the covariates specified for models (a) to (j), as defined in appendix D. The models with lagged dDff t on the right-hand-side point to a significant response to a change in monetary policy at a 5% significance level at eight or more quarters lead. This result is robust in Romer models (d) to (f) and Taylor models (i) and (j). There is also isolated evidence of a response (at the 10% level) at earlier leads using models (e) to (j) in panel b of table 1. For models with dff t on the right-hand side, the lag pattern is more mixed. The baseline and restricted Romer models (a) and (b) and the lag-quadratic Taylor model (h) predict a response after seven quarters, while the lag-quadratic Romer model (c) predicts a response after eight quarters and the baseline Taylor model (g) predicts a response after six quarters. The lag-quadratic Taylor model (h) generates an isolated initial impact of the monetary policy shock, but this does not persist at longer horizons. Tests at the 10% level generally show earlier effects at 24 Monthly GDP is interpolated from quarterly using a program developed by Mönch and Uhlig (2005) . We thank Emanuel Mönch and Harald Uhlig for providing the code for this. The inflation rate is calculated as the change in the log of the seasonally unadjusted CPI of urban consumers, less food and energy. −3.02 * * * −2.97 * * * −3.05 * * * −3.29 * * * −3.05 * * * 10 −2.83 * * * −2.81 * * * −2.83 * * * −3.32 * * * −3.02 * * * 11 −3.28 * * * −3.23 * * * −3.25 * * * −3.53 * * * −3.27 * * * 12 −3.37 * * * −3.26 * * * −3.27 * * * −3.62 * * * −3.45 * * *
The table reports t-statistics for parametric Sims causality tests for the response of the change in the log of the nonseasonally adjusted index of industrial production to monetary policy shocks. Columns report results using alternative models for the policy propensity score. Model details are summarized in appendix D. * Significant at 10%. * * Significant at 5%. * * * Significant at 1%. six to seven quarters out for the restricted and lag-quadratic Romer models (b) and (c).
While easy to implement, the parametric Sims causality tests do not tell us about differences in the effects of rate increases and decreases and may not detect nonlinearities in the relationship between policy and outcomes or effects of policy on higher-order moments. The semiparametric tests developed in sections III and IV do all this in an internally consistent way without the need for an elaborate model for outcomes. Semiparametric tests can also be used to explore possible misspecification of the propensity score. This is done by substituting 1{z ti ≤ v 2i } for 1{z t ≤ v 2 } in equation (8), wherez it denotes all the covariates that appear in models a through j.
The specification tests reported in table 2 suggest the baseline Romer model (a), and modifications (c) and (e) fit well. 25 The Taylor models fit less well, with moment restrictions violated most notably for the innovation in the Greenbook forecast for the percentage change in GDP. This suggests that the Taylor models do not fully account for all the information the Federal Reserve seems to rely on in its policy 738 THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS decisions. The Taylor models also generate some rejections of moment conditions related to lagged dDff t , an indication that they do not fully account for the dynamic pattern of Federal Reserve policy actions. The Romer models appear to implicitly account for lagged real GDP growth and inflation in spite of the fact that these variables are not included in the Romer propensity score. We now turn to the semiparametric causality tests based on the unconditional moment conditions in equation (7). All pvalues reported in tables 3 to 5 are based on the VM statistic defined in equation (20) . In the first implementation, D t is a bivariate vector containing dummy variables for an up or down movement in dDff t . This amounts to a joint test of the overall effect of a monetary policy shock.
The first set of semiparametric test results are reported in table 3. As in table 2, table 3 shows p-values and starred significance levels. These tests look simultaneously at the significance of up and down movements in a single test statistic, in a manner analogous to the parametric tests in table 1.
The results in table 3 show significant effects at the 5% level starting ten quarters ahead. The baseline Taylor model also generates significant effects as early as in quarter 7. The lag-quadratic Taylor model (h), and the Taylor models with discrete baseline (i) and (j) also generate significant effects starting in quarter 8. The restricted and lag-quadratic Romer models, (b), (c), (e), and (f), generate the longest lag in policy effects at about ten quarters, although the restricted and lagquadratic Romer models with discrete baseline, (e) and (f), also show weaker significance at the 10% level as early as three quarters ahead.
We also considered the effects of positive and negative monetary shocks separately. The asymmetric tests again use moment condition (7), but the tests in this case are constructed from D t = dDffU t , indicating upward movements in the intended funds rate and D t = dDffD t , indicating decreases in the intended funds rate. Ordered probit models for the policy propensity score generate the conditional expectation of both dDffD t and dDffU t and can therefore be used to construct the surprise variable at the core of our testing framework. The asymmetric results are shown only for models that do well in the model specification tests in table 2. These are the baseline and lag-quadratic Romer models (a) and (c), the restricted Romer model with discrete baseline (e), and the lag-quadratic Taylor model (h) .
The picture that emerges from table 4 is mostly one of insignificant responses to a surprise reduction in the intended federal funds rate. In particular, the only models to show a statistically significant response to a decrease at the 5% level are the baseline Romer model (a) and the lag-quadratic Romer model (c), where a response appears after ten quarters. Results for Taylor model, (h) generate an isolated significant test two-and-a-half years out. There is a less significant (10% level) response in the lag-quadratic Romer model with discrete baseline (e) and the lag-quadratic Taylor model (h) at a ten-or eleven-quarter lead as well.
The results in table 5 contrast with those in table 4 , showing significant effects of an increase in the funds rate after six quarters for Romer specification (a) and after three quarters for Romer specification (e). Taylor specification h also shows a strongly significant effect somewhere between quarter 7 or 8. Models (a) and (h) generate a less significant early response at quarters 4 and 5. Also in contrast with table 4, some of the results in table 5 are significant at the 1% level.
The results in table 5 shed some light on the findings in table 3, which pool up and down policy changes. The pooled results suggest a more immediate response for the baseline Romer specification (a) than for the lag-quadratic Taylor specification (h). This is consistent with the results in table 5, where Romer model (a) uncovers a more immediate response to interest rate increases with a particularly strong response at a lead of seven quarters, but generates less significant test results than the Taylor models at leads farther out.
VI. Conclusion
This paper develops a causal framework for time series data. The foundation of our approach is an adaptation of the potential-outcomes and selection-on-observables ideas widely used in cross-sectional studies. This adaptation leads 740 THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS (20) and based on the moment condition 7 with φ(Ut , v) equal to 1{yt < v1}. In this implementation, Dt is a bivariate vector containing dummy variables for an up-or-down movement of dDfft . Columns report results using alternative models for the policy propensity score. Model details are summarized in appendix D. * Significant at 10%. * * Significant at 5%. * * * Significant at 1%. to a definition of causality similar to that proposed by Sims (1972) . For models with covariates, Sims causality differs from Granger causality, which potentially confuses endogenous system dynamics with the causal effects of isolated policy actions. In contrast, Sims causality hones in on the effect of isolated policy shocks relative to a well-defined counterfactual baseline. Causal inference in our framework is based on a multinomial model for the policy assignment mechanism, a model we call the policy propensity score. In particular, we develop a new semiparametric test of conditional independence that uses the policy propensity score. This procedure tests the selection-on-observables null hypothesis that lies at the heart of much of the empirical work on time series causal effects.
A major advantage of our approach is that it does not require researchers to model the process determining the outcomes of interest. The resulting test has power against all alternatives but can be finely tuned to look at specific questions, such as mean independence or a particular type of causal response. Our testing framework can also be used to evaluate the specification of the policy propensity score.
Our approach is illustrated with a reanalysis of the data and policy model in Romer and Romer (2004) , along with a simple Taylor model. Our findings point to a significant response to monetary policy shocks after about seven quarters. These results are broadly in line with those in Romer and Romer (2004) , who report the strongest response to a monetary shock after about two years with continued effects for another year. On the other hand, an investigation allowing different responses to rate increases and decreases shows an early and significant response to rate increases without much of a response to rate decreases. This result has not featured in most previous discussions of the causal effects of monetary shocks.
In contrast with the Romer and Romer (2004) findings and those reported here, SVAR studies generally report more immediate responses to a monetary shock. For example, Christiano et al. (1999) report a decline in real GDP two quarters after a policy shock with the impulse response function showing a hump-shaped pattern and a maximal decline one to one and half years after the shock. Sims and Zha (2006) also find a statistically significant decline of real GDP in response to a money supply shock, with most of the effect occurring in the first year after the shock. SVAR analysis of Taylortype monetary policy functions in Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) similarly suggests a response after two quarters and a rapidly declining hump-shaped impulse response function. Thus, while SVAR findings similarly suggest that monetary policy matters, some of the early impact that crops up in the SVAR literature may be generated in part by the structural assumptions used to identify these models.
An important topic for future research is the estimation of causal effects in situations where our tests reject the null hypothesis of no causal effect. We are currently exploring estimation strategies using a propensity score framework. The resulting estimators are similar in spirit to propensity score estimators for cross-sectional causal effects. However, a complication relative to the cross-sectional literature is the dynamic nature of responses to a policy shock. We are developing simple strategies to summarize and do inference for these dynamics.
APPENDIX A: GENERAL TEST STATISTICS
This appendix shows how to extend the statistics from test functions 1{U t ≤ v} to general functions φ(U t , v). The null hypothesis of conditional independence can be represented very generally in terms of moment conditions for functions of U t . Let φ(., .) : R k ×R k → H be a function of U t and some index v where H is some set. Our development below allows φ(U t , v) to be an M × M matrix of functions of U t and v such that H = R M × R M . However, it is often sufficient to consider the case where φ(., .) is scalar valued with H = R, a possibility that is also covered by our theory. Under the null, we then have E[φ(U t , v)(D t − p(z t ))|z t ] = 0. Examples of functions φ(., .) are φ(U t , v) = exp(iv U t ) where i = √ −1, as suggested by Bierens (1982) and Su and White (2003) , or φ(U t , v) = 1{U t ≤ v}, the case considered in section III.
While omnibus tests can detect departures from the null in all directions, this is associated with a loss in power and may not shed light on specific alternatives of interest. Additional tests of practical relevance therefore focus on specific alternatives. An example is the test of the moment condition E[y t (D t − p(z t ))|z t ] = 0, which is rejected if there is correlation between y t and the policy innovation conditional on z t . Such a test can be implemented by choosing φ(U t , v) = y t 1{z t ≤ v 2 }. Generalizations to the effects on higher moments can be handled similarly.
To specify the generalized tests, we extend the definition of V n (v) = n −1/2 n t=1 m(y t , D t , z t , θ 0 ; v) by setting
It follows that
where H(v) is defined in equation (9). The transformation T now is given by
where C λ ,V (.), and π ⊥ λl (., θ) are defined as before. In the same way, define an estimator T n wherê W n (v) ≡ T n V n (v) =V n (v) − φ(u, v)dĤ n (u)d(π λl (u,θ)) Ĉ −1 λV n π ⊥ λl (.,θ) ,
withV n (π ⊥ λl (.,θ) ), andĤ n (v) as in section IVA. For A λ = [−∞, λ] × [−∞, ∞] k−1 , one obtainŝ The empirical version of the transformed statistic iŝ Bŵ ,n (w) =Ŵŵ ,n (φ(., w)ĥ w (.) −1/2 )
whereÂ n,s is as defined before. For the bootstrapped statistiĉ B * w,n;s (w), replace m T ,t (v,θ) with
in equation (23).
APPENDIX B: IMPLEMENTATION DETAILS
B.1. Details for the Khmaladze Transform. To construct the test statistic proposed in the theoretical discussion, we must deal with the fact that the transformation T is unknown and needs to be replaced by an estimator. In this section, we discuss the details that lead to the formulation in equation (17). We also present results for general sets A λ . We start by defining the empirical distribution − p(z t ,θ)p(z t ,θ) )1{U t ≤ v}.
We now use the sets A λ and projections π λ as defined in section IV A. Let
(1 − 1{U t ∈ A λ })l(U t ,θ) (diag(p(z t ,θ)) − p(z t ,θ)p(z t ,θ) )l(U t ,θ),
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where φ(u, v)dĤ n (u)π λl (.,θ)
Finally, writê V n (π ⊥ λl (u,θ)) = n −1/2 n t=1
(1 − 1{U t ∈ A λ })l(U t ,θ) (D t − p(z t ,θ)).
We now specialize the choice of sets A λ to A λ = [−∞, λ]× [−∞, ∞] k−1 . Denote the first element of y t by y 1t . Then C λ = n −1 n t=1 1{y 1t > λ}l(z t ,θ)(diag(p(z t ,θ)) − p(z t ,θ)p(z t ,θ) )l(z t ,θ) ,
V n (π ⊥ λl (u,θ)) = n −1/2 n t=1 1{y 1t > λ}l(U t ,θ) (D t − p(z t ,θ)) (B3) and φ(u, v)dĤ n (u)π λl (u,θ)
= n −1 n t=1 1{y 1t ≤ λ}φ{U t , v} ∂p(z t ,θ) ∂θ .
Combining equations (B2-B4) then leads to the formulation (17).
B.2. Details for the Rosenblatt Transform
As before, implementation requires replacement of θ with an estimate. We therefore work with the processV w,n (v) = n −1/2 n t=1 m w (w t , D t ,θ; w). Define gray0 t Same as above, for current quarter. gray1 t Same as above, for one quarter ahead. gray2 t Same as above, for two quarters ahead. igrym t The innovation in the Greenbook forecast for the percentage change in GDP (at an annual rate) for the previous quarter from the meeting before. The horizon of the forecast for the meeting before is adjusted so that the forecasts for the two meetings always refer to the same quarter.
igry0 t Same as above, for current quarter.
igry1 t Same as above, for one quarter ahead.
igry2 t Same as above, for two quarters ahead. gradm t Greenbook forecast of the percentage change in the GDP deflator (at an annual rate) for the previous quarter.
grad0 t Same as above, for current quarter. grad1 t Same as above, for one quarter ahead.
grad2 t Same as above, for two quarters ahead. igrdm t The innovation in the Greenbook forecast for the percentage change in the GDP deflator (at an annual rate) for the previous quarter from the meeting before. The horizon of the forecast for the meeting before is adjusted so that the forecasts for the two meetings always refer to the same quarter.
igrd0 t Same as above, for current quarter.
igrd1 t Same as above, for one quarter ahead.
igrd2 t Same as above, for two quarters ahead.
